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A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals in
the same time scale; e.g., players use the same frequency to update their strategies. Variation in learning rates
within populations suggests that evolutionary game theory may not necessarily be restricted to uniform time
scales associated with the game interaction and strategy adaption evolution. In this study, we remove this
restricting assumption by dividing the population into fast and slow groups according to the players’ strategy
updating frequencies and investigate how different strategy compositions of one group influence the evolutionary
outcome of the other’s fixation probabilities of strategies within its own group. Analytical analysis and numerical
calculations are performed to study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in typical classes of two-player
games (prisoner’s dilemma game, snowdrift game, and stag-hunt game). The introduction of the heterogeneity
in strategy-update time scales leads to substantial changes in the evolution dynamics of strategies. We provide an
approximation formula for the fixation probability of mutant types in finite populations and study the outcome
of strategy evolution under the weak selection. We find that although heterogeneity in time scales makes the
collective evolutionary dynamics more complicated, the possible long-run evolutionary outcome can be effectively
predicted under technical assumptions when knowing the population composition and payoff parameters.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.94.032407
I. INTRODUCTION
How cooperation among nonrelatives can persist in the
face of cheating remains a fundamental, profound, and broad-
ranging unsolved question in evolutionary biology [1–3].
Evolutionary game theory is the mathematical framework
that has provided the deepest insight into this issue [4–6].
Several approaches or frameworks have been proposed in
the analysis of strategy evolution and a popular one is the
integration of the microscopic patterns of interactions among
individuals into the evolutionary setting [7,8]. Furthermore,
coevolution of interaction patterns and cooperative behavior
has also been identified as a key factor that may enhance or
hinder altruism [9–11]. In spite of exciting progresses that
have been reported in the past, there are still situations of great
practical relevance that remain less explored, and one of them
is the role played by time scales when individuals interact and
update their strategies [12,13].
Time scales may be associated to different temporal
dynamics in evolutionary games, and is a key component in
the evolution dynamics. In the general gaming study, there
are two time scales in the game dynamics: one is interaction
time scale determining how frequently the individuals interact
with game partners, and the other is strategy-selection time
scale that signifies how frequently they renovate their strategies
[14–19]. Many evolutionary game studies make the additional
assumption that selection occurs much more slowly than
the interaction between individuals. However, this may not
always be the case. For instance, experimental studies show
that the time scale of selection is much closer to the time
scale of interaction in cultural evolution or social learning.
Notwithstanding this, the pace at which selection acts on
the population is crucial for the appearance and stability of
cooperation. How to separate the selection action from the
game interaction thus certainly deserves needful attention.
Besides, the majority of the literature does not distinguish the
two scales that much and tends to discuss them at the same time
by assuming that each round of interaction is always followed
by a round of updating, in which individuals can change their
current strategies according to different rules.
The time scales associated with game interaction and
strategy updating of individuals may be subject to more delib-
erate rules, with a view to the personal preferences [20–22].
For instance, conservative players prefer the slow strategy
adaptations, since they perceive that frequent strategy updating
may bring unknown or costly hazard. In contrast, risk-seeking
agents are inclined toward seeking new profitable strategies
frequently, irrespective of the possible failure in boosting
profits. Thus, the role of behavioral preferences in gaming
populations should not be disregarded, especially when the
cooperative behaviors and dilemma are common phenomena
in social systems. In this sense, a deep understanding of it
is therefore demanding. Motivated by this fact, we allow
individuals to retain heterogeneous time scales associated with
game interaction and strategy updating. Our objective here is
to understand better what aspects of individual heterogeneity
in time scales can influence the strategy evolution outcomes
in the played evolutionary games. In short, we aim to
elaborate on the influence of expanding the homogeneity of
time to binary choices of fast-updating and slow-updating,
among pure-strategy agents on cooperation evolution. As
mentioned, several simulation works on this topic have been
established especially in spatial populations; however, the lack
of theoretical results motivates us to make a complementary
contribution in studying cooperative problems mathematically.
From the perspective of individual intelligence, including
the fact that individuals may have different capabilities to
update their strategy frequently [23–27], we focus on the
heterogeneity in how often an individual updates her strategy
after repeatedly interacting with the peers. Our goal is thus
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to understand better how updating frequency may affect
strategic competition and thereby promote or inhibit altruistic
behaviors.
As a first cut, we assume the overall population can be
divided into two groups, and the individuals in one update
faster than those in the other. When the updating dynamics
of the fast and slow groups can be completely decoupled, we
give closed-form approximations for the fixation probabilities
of strategies in their groups and such predictions are validated
by simulations for the prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift, and stag-
hunt games. Further analyses are carried out for populations
under weak selection as well. All the theoretical computation
and simulation results reveal that heterogeneity in strategy-
update time scales indeed leads to much richer evolutionary
outcomes. The different strategy composition of one group
always influences the evolution of the other group; the extent
to which the influence is exerted depends on the game payoffs
and the relative sizes of the groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the basic game model and analyzes the evolutionary
dynamics of the strategies under different updating time scales.
Section III discusses the implications of the analytical results
for the three typical types of two-player games. Section IV
investigates the model under weak selection. Finally, in Sec. V
we make concluding remarks.
II. EVOLUTIONARY GAME DYNAMICS
FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DIFFERENT
STRATEGY-UPDATE FREQUENCIES
A. Setup of the model
We consider a finite and well-mixed population of N
individuals who are playing a two-player game, where each
player can make a choice from two available strategies, A (e.g.,
cooperation) and B (e.g., defection). An A player interacting
with another A player receives the payoff a, and otherwise
when interacting with a B player, obtains b. Similarly, a B
player receives c when playing with an A player and d with







The game is played round after round, and we use πA(t) and
πB(t), t = 0,1,2, . . ., to denote the average payoffs of A and
B players in round t , respectively. After game playing in each
game round, an individual is chosen randomly to update its
strategy. To be more concrete, when just finishing round t , the
chosen individual randomly select another individual from the
population to compare their strategies; if they hold the same
strategy, the focal player keeps her current strategy in the next
game round and otherwise if the strategies are different, say
the focal agent is an A player and her chosen partner is a B
player, the focal agent will switch her strategy according to
the probability given by the Fermi function,
p(t) = 1
1 + e−w[πB (t)−πA(t)] , (2)
where the constant w is called the intensity of selection since
w → ∞ leads to strong selection where the probability for
selecting fitter individual is 1 and when w  1, the update
reduces to the Moran process under the weak selection [28].
Obviously, one only needs to swap the positions of πA and
πB on the righthand side of Eq. (2) to calculate p(t) if at t
the updating individual plays B and its comparing individual
plays A.
Here it is worth referring to the scope of strategy updating,
from where the focal player can select the referable players
for strategy updating. Since our motivation is based on the
individual intelligence and heterogeneity, the strategy updating
in pairs of players is closely related to the gaming surroundings
around them. Considering the employed Fermi function that
decides the switching probability between players adopting
different strategies, the payoffs and strategies are the key
components in it. In this sense, an implicit assumption in our
work is that the available information needs to be known to
the focal player, when she chooses some partner for strategy
updating. It is reasonable to assume that there is a positive
correlation between the individuals’ ability to spread their own
strategy and gaining other individuals’ strategy information.
For example, the fast individuals can only obtain other fast
individuals’ information, due to the poorer ability of the slow
players to spread their information.
Accordingly, we assume that the whole population consists
of two subpopulations and an updating individual only chooses
a referable agent from her group: one is called the fast group,
since one individual is chosen randomly from this group to
update every round, and the other is called the slow group, since
a member from this group is chosen to update her strategy every
s  1 rounds. Therefore, when s = 1, the overall population
is homogeneous in the strategy-update frequencies and when
s → ∞ the update processes of the fast and slow groups
are completely decoupled. We call s the time scale of the
strategy updating actions and thus when s > 1, the overall
population is heterogeneous in the time scales of individuals’
updates. To keep the analysis tractable and emphasize the
most relevant features of the results, we focus on investigating
analytically the case when s → ∞; in Figs. 4–6, we show
through simulations that when s takes other values, the main
conclusions of the paper still hold.
B. Calculation of the fixation probabilities
Since A and B, respectively, denote the available strategies
in the employed two-strategy game here, the average payoffs
πA and πB in the gaming population are calculated as
follows. We assume that in the current round there are M
fast individuals, or equivalently N − M slow ones, in the
population. Let j be the number of A players in the fast group
and i be that in the slow group. Then
πA = j + i − 1
N − 1 a +
N − j − i
N − 1 b,
πB = j + i
N − 1c +
N − j − i − 1
N − 1 d. (3)
So for the fast players, in the next round, the num-
ber of A players will change according to the following
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probabilities:






1 + e−ω(πA−πB ) ,






1 + eω(πA−πB ) , (4)
where T +j denotes the probability to increase by one and T
−
j
to decrease by one. One can check that the sum of T +j and





, which is exactly the probability that the





= e−w(πA−πB ) (5)
determines the fixation probability φj [28], which in this
problem setup is the probability that all the fast players use A












It follows from Eq. (3) that
πA − πB = 2u(j + i)
N − 1 +
2v
N − 1 , (7)
where
u = a − b − c + d
2
v = −a + bN − dN + d
2
. (8)










By applying the computational technique in Ref. [29], it
can be shown that when u = 0, the fixation probability is
approximated by
φj = erf(ξj ) − erf(ξ0)
erf(ξM ) − erf(ξ0) , (10)









u(N − 1) [(j + i)u + v], (11)









Note that the approximation Eqs. (10) and (12) are applica-
ble to any intensity of selection w and any j ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}.
Then we shift our attention to the evolution dynamics of
slow players. Given the assumption of s → ∞, when a slow
player is chosen to update, the strategic choices of the fast
players have already evolved into one of the two absorbing
full-A or full-B states. Similarly, we can get the fixation
probabilities of strategies in their groups for the slow players
if u = 0,
φj = erf(ξj ) − erf(ξ0)
erf(ξN− ¯M ) − erf(ξ0)
, (13)
where ¯M = 0 if the fast group evolves into the all-B state and




u(N − 1) [(j +
¯M)u + v]; (14)








Synthesizing the fixation probabilities of the fast group
described by Eqs. (10) and (12), and that of the slow group
described by Eqs. (13) and (15), we can obtain the fixation
probabilities for the overall population of N individuals of
both fast and slow players. Let n denote the size of the current
group of interest, j and i the numbers of A players in the
current group and the other group, respectively, and ξj , u,
and v the same as in Eqs. (10) and (7), respectively. Then the
unified expression for the fixation probabilities is that when
u = 0,
φj = erf(ξj ) − erf(ξ0)
erf(ξn) − erf(ξ0) , (16)








Note that i takes its value from {0,1, . . . ,N − M} when the
current group is the fast group, while i is either 0 or M when
the slow group is of interest.
Several well established game models can fully describe
the possible cooperative dilemmas in the real social societies,
where the degree of conflict between strategies may differ.
Using the calculated fixation probabilities, next we will
investigate the evolutionary outcomes for three different types
of games, where strategy B dominates, A and B coexist, or
coordination of A and B is preferred.
III. TYPICAL TWO-PLAYER GAMES
The analytical results have shown that the fixation probabil-
ities depend on not only the initial number ofA players, but also
the relative sizes of the fast and slow groups. In this section, to
further demonstrate this point and, more importantly, to gain
insight into how population-level cooperation is influenced,
we carry out simulation studies on three typical types of
two-player games that are classified according to the structures
of the payoff matrix specified in Eq. (1), namely dominance
of B (c > a and d > b), coexistence of A and B (a < c and
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All B−Players in Slow Group
Half are A−Players in Slow Group
All A−Players in Slow Group











All B−Players in Slow Group
Half are A−Players in Slow Group
All A−Players in Slow Group
FIG. 1. Fixation probabilities for the game whose dominance strategy is B with different selection intensity: (a) ω = 0.25, and (b)
ω = 0.05. The payoff parameter values of the prisoner’s dilemma game: a = 3, b = 1, c = 5, d = 2. Here, the horizontal axis means the
fixatation probability of strategy A in the fast group, while the vertical axis represents the initial number of A players in the fast group. The
following settings are the same in Figs. 2 and 3. Simulation results (symbols) coincide perfectly with the approximation results (solid lines).
The approximation results are from Eq. (10). Each simulation result corresponds to the average frequency of fixation of A players from 100
independent realizations. Here, the results show that the heterogeneity of time scales on updating has only limited effects on the fixation
probabilities.
b > d), and a coordination game (a > c and b < d). In all the
simulations, we take N = 80 and M = 40.
A. Game with dominating B
Consider the game in which strategy B always dominates,
so a B player always obtains a higher payoff than an A player
no matter what the fraction of B players is in the population.
Thus, it must be true that c > a and d > b. A well-known
example is the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) with c > a >
d > b, in which a defector is always promised with the highest
fitness when facing a cooperator, an exploited cooperator is
worse off than a defector playing with another defector, and
thus defection is the unique Nash equilibrium [31]. In our
simulations, we take a = 3, b = 1, c = 5, d = 2, and then A
corresponds to cooperation and B defection in a PDG.
We show the results in Fig. 1(a) for ω = 0.25 and Fig. 1(b)
for ω = 0.05, which are in perfect agreement with the
analytical prediction. It is clear that when the number of A
players in the slow group varies, the fixation probability of A
players in the fast group changes correspondingly, although the
changes are not significant. So the heterogeneity in time scales
affects the outcome of the simulated PDG, but not significantly.
B. Game with coexisting A and B
Consider the game in which B is the best reply to A (c > a),
and at the same time A is the best reply to B (b > d). A typical
example is the hawk-dove game or the snowdrift game (SDG).
For infinite populations, the replicator dynamics predict the
stable coexistence of A and B. For simplicity, we take the
payoffs in the SDG to be a = 3, b = 2, c = 5, d = 1, and then
A is to cooperate and B to defect.
Compared with the simulation results for PDG, a sub-
stantially different phenomenon takes place for SDG in the
evolutionary outcomes that shows the strong influence of time
scales. Figure 2 shows that more B players in the slow group
lead to much bigger fixation probabilities of A strategy in the
fast group. The reason is rooted in the fact that the more B
players in the slow group, the higher payoffs of A players in
the fast group, and hence higher chance for having more A
players. Again this matches the analytical prediction.
C. Coordination game
Finally, let us discuss coordination games in which a >
c and b < d, and then A is the best reply to A and at the
same time B is the best reply to B. The replicator equation of
such systems exhibit bistability: if the fraction of A players is
sufficiently high in the beginning,A players will reach fixation;
otherwise, B players will dominate. The stronger the intensity
of selection, the less likely it is that a single A player can take
over a B population. Here, we focus on the stag-hunt game
(SHG) as an example of a coordination game. We take a = 5,
b = 1, c = 3, d = 2 here, where A presents cooperation and
B denotes defection.
The evolutionary outcomes depicted in Fig. 3 show a perfect
matching between theoretical prediction and simulation. It can
be observed that the time scale heterogeneity clearly changes
the evolutionary outcomes. For instance, more A players in
the slow group lead to a large increment of the A’s fixation
probability in the fast group. The reason is that the more A
players in the slow group, the higher payoffs of A players
in the fast group, and thus more intensely the strategy A is
promoted. The observation that increasing the fraction of one
strategy in the slow group benefits the evolution of the same
strategy in the fast group merits special attention, since it is
the opposite of the results in SDG.
Although our analytical results in the previous section and
the simulation results in this section only study the idealized
case when s → ∞, in Figs. 4, 5, and 6 we demonstrate that
when s takes its values of 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, and 100, similar
conclusions on how the strategy composition of the slow group
affects the evolutionary outcome of the fast group are still ap-
plicable. This underscores the importance of the insight gained
from our analytical prediction and, in fact, now one can always
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All B−Players in Slow Group
Half are A−Players in Slow Group
All A−Players in Slow Group











All B−Players in Slow Group
Half are A−Players in Slow Group
All A−Players in Slow Group
FIG. 2. Evolutionary outcomes for the games where A and B will stably coexist. (a) ω = 0.25, and (b) ω = 0.05. The payoff parameter
values of snowdrift game: a = 3, b = 2, c = 5, d = 1. Here, the horizontal axis means the fixatation probability of strategy A in the fast
group, while the vertical axis represents the initial number of A players in the fast group. Results show that the heterogeneity of time scales on
updating has significant effects on the fixation of probabilities of strategies in their groups. Specifically, more opposite strategies in the other
group promote a strategy to get fixation in its own group.
predict with confidence whether a strategy in the fast group
will be promoted or inhibited when facing a slow group of
different strategy compositions. One may question, however,
whether the conclusions are still applicable for populations
under weak selection (payoff trivially influences the fitness
of individuals) when ω  1, since then the approximation in
our previous calculation becomes less effective. To address
this concern, in the next section, we study the case when
ω  1.
IV. FIXATION PROBABILITY UNDER WEAK SELECTION
A. Strategy evolution for fast players
For ω  1, our model reduces to the Moran process
under weak selection. Then, we address the weak selection




≈ 1 − ω(πA − πB), (18)
which after being substituted into Eq. (6) leads to
φj ≈
1 +∑j−1k=1 [1 − ω( uN−1k2 + ( uN−1 + 2vN−1 + 2uiN−1 )k)]




+ ω(M − j )j
6M(N − 1) [N (a − b − c + d)(3(1 − α)β + α)
+ (a − b− c+ d)j + 3(b− d)N − 3a + 3d], (20)
where α = M/N , β = i/(N − M), u = a−b−c+d2 , and v =−a+b+N−d+N
2 .
Under weak selection, φj > j/M means
a − b − c + d
3
[α + 3(1 − α)β] + (b − d) > 0. (21)
Note that when α = 1, namely the population is homoge-
neous in their time scales, the above results agree with those
for a variety of Moran processes under weak selection [32].





























All B−Players in Slow Group
Half are A−Players in Slow Group
All A−Players in Slow Group











All B−Players in Slow Group
Half are A−Players in Slow Group
All A−Players in Slow Group
FIG. 3. Evolutionary outcomes for the coordination games. (a) ω = 0.25, and (b) ω = 0.05. The payoff parameter values of stag-hunt game:
a = 5, b = 1, c = 3, d = 2. Here, the results show that diversity of time scales on updating has significant effects on the fixation probabilities.
Different with the results shown in Fig. 2, more opposite strategies in the other group inhibit a strategy to get fixation in its own group.
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Initial number of A−players in the fast group
FIG. 4. Simulation results of games whose dominating strategy is B. Here, the horizontal axis means the fixation probability of strategy
A in the fast group, while the vertical axis represents the initial number of A players in the fast group. ω = 0.25 and ω = 0.05, respectively.
The initial numbers of A players in the slow groups are 1 (green lines), 20 (red lines), and 39 (blue lines) for comparison. Moreover, though
a group of values s = 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 100 are used here, the nondistinctive differences between them make it unnecessary to distinguish them
with different colors. The simulation results here show notable consistence with the theoretical results in Fig. 1, suggesting the validity of our
theoretical analysis.
B. Strategy evolution for slow players
After the fast players have evolved into their absorbing
states, the slow players start their evolution processes. We
have to carry out our computation for two separate absorbing
states of fast players, all-A and all-B, separately.
1. Scenario I: Fast players converge to the all-A state
Now let i be the number of A players among slow players.
Then the payoffs of strategy A and B for slow players are
πA = M + i − 1
N − 1 a +
N − M − i
N − 1 b,
πB = M + i
N − 1c +
N − M − i − 1
N − 1 d. (22)
So the probability to have i + 1 or i − 1 A players in the
slow players in the next game round when having j A players




N − M − i
M
1




N − M − i
M
1
1 + e+ω(πA−πB ) . (23)
Similarly,
φi ≈
1+∑ik=1 [1 − ω( uN−1k2+( uN−1 + 2vN−1 + 2uN−1M)k)]




ω(N −M − 1)
6(N −M)(N − 1) [N (a − b− c+ d)(2α + 1)
+ (a − b− c+ d)i + 3(b− d)N − 3a + 3d], (25)
where α, u, and v are the same as in Eq. (19).
Under weak selection, if strategy A performs better
than neutral selection [i.e., φ1 > 1/(N − M)], the following



































Initial number of A−players in the fast group
FIG. 5. Simulation results of games where A and B will stably coexist. Here, the horizontal axis means the fixation probability of strategy
A in the fast group, while the vertical axis represents the initial number of A players in the fast group. ω = 0.25 and ω = 0.05, respectively.
The initial numbers of A players in the slow groups are 1 (green lines), 20 (red lines), and 39 (blue lines) for comparison. Still, we do not
distinguish s = 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 100 with different colors. The simulation results here show much consistence with the theoretical results in
Fig. 2, suggesting the validity of our theoretical analysis.
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Initial number of A−players in the fast group
FIG. 6. Simulation results of the coordination games. Here, the horizontal axis means the fixation probability of strategy A in the fast group,
while the vertical axis represents the initial number of A players in the fast group. ω = 0.25 and ω = 0.05, respectively. The initial numbers
of A players in the slow groups are 1 (green lines), 20 (red lines), and 39 (blue lines) for comparison. The simulation results here show notable
consistence with the theoretical results in Fig. 3, suggesting the validity of our theoretical analysis.
condition should be satisfied:
(a − b − c + d)(2α + 1) + 3(b − d) > 0. (26)
Thus, natural selection favors a single mutant A to eventu-
ally replace a population of B players.
2. Scenario II: Fast players converge to the all-B state
In this case, the payoffs for playing A or B in slow players
are
πA = i − 1
N − 1a +
N − M − i
N − 1 b,
πB = i
N − 1c +
N − M − i − 1
N − 1 d. (27)
The fixation probability under weak selection reads
	i ≈
1 +∑i−1k=1 [1 − ω( uN−1k2 + ( uN−1 + 2vN−1)k)]
1 +∑N−M−1k=1 [1 − ω( uN−1k2 + ( uN−1 + 2vN−1 )k)]
(28)
= i
N − M +
ω(N − M − 1)
6(N − M)(N − 1) [N (a − b− c+ d)(1 −α)
+ (a − b − c + d)i + 3(b − d)N − 3a + 3d]. (29)
Here, α, u, and v are the same as in Eq. (19).
Under weak selection, strategy A performs better than
neutral selection, if
(a − b − c + d)(1 − α) + 3(b − d) > 0. (30)
In this case, natural selection favors a single mutant A
to eventually replace a population of B players. So no matter
which absorbing state (all-A or all-B) the fast players converge
to, the evolutionary outcome of the slow players is always
affected by the relative sizes of fast and slow players, which is
further scaled by the payoffs.
V. SIMULATIONS
To verify our theoretical results shown in the main text, we
also establish computer simulations under the assumption that
the two subpopulations (fast or slow) are partly decoupled.
The specific results are about the dependence of the fixation
probability of strategy A on the initial number of A players in
the fast group, the initial number ofA players in the slow group,
the s, and the ω. In the given figures, each datum corresponds
to the fraction of fixation of strategy A in the 100 independent
realizations.
Though a group of values s = 1, 2, 5, 10, 50, 100 are used
here, the nondistinctive differences between them make it
unnecessary to distinguish them with different colors. The
values of s do not have significant influences on the fixation
probability of strategy A in the fast groups. One main
conclusion provided by the simulation results is that our
theoretical analysis is valid. In our calculation of fixation
probability of the strategy, we assume that when a slow player
is chosen to update, the strategic choices of the fast players
have already evolved into one of the two absorbing full-A
or full-B states. Even without the restrictive assumption just
mentioned, the same conclusions have again been validated
through simulation results.
VI. CONCLUSION
The origin of cooperation has been one of the hot spots
in evolutionary biology for decades with natural selection
in its kernel. In fact, selection frequencies may vibrate in a
population. Our theoretical model is largely different from
previous studies by introducing individual heterogeneity in
their strategy-update time scales. Herein, by introducing a
crucial parameter s as the ratio between time scales of fast
and slow players, we are enabled to provide closed-form
approximation for the evolutionary outcome of fast and slow
groups when s → ∞. One crucial step is that under the
simplifying condition, the fast players always enter their
absorbing states before the slow players start to update. This
condition can be easily removed when one is only interested
in simulation study and in fact our simulation results have
indicated that the conclusion in the paper still holds when the
fast and slow strategy-updating dynamics are coupled.
We have derived a sequence of approximation formulas
that determine the fixation probabilities under a range of
initial conditions. The difference in time scales leads to
much richer evolutionary dynamics for typical two-player
games, which underlines the importance and generality of
our findings. We find that time scale diversity has different
influences on different game models. Specifically, in the
prisoner’s dilemma game where only defection is the dominant
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strategy, the fixation probabilities of strategies in one group
changes only slightly when the composition of strategies
of the other group changes. In the snowdrift game, which
allows for stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in
well-mixed populations, the corresponding changes are much
more significant. In the stag-hunt game, in which each strategy
is the best reply to itself, the corresponding changes are again
significant, but the promoted strategy is the opposite of that in
the snowdrift game. In addition to the approximation results,
we study the evolutionary dynamics with different time scales
under weak selection.
The result reported here could flexibly lend itself to
multiple extensions. In the current model we limited our
study to the situation where only two types of players are
considered, while multiple types may be more common in
practical settings. Thus, investigating what happens in the
presence of increasing diversity or even dynamically varying
strategy-update frequencies is an intriguing topic to be studied
in the future. Besides, alternative definitions of time scales
deserve further attention to look for plausible explanations for
the individual heterogeneity and ultimately the persistence of
cooperation.
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